Separate storage
Two accounts on the same service use two partitions. Signing into one cannot overwrite the other's cookies or leak a session into it.
Security & privacy
Private by architecture.
Honest about limits.
My Provider Dash Manager is a local Windows app, not a hosted account service. There is no server, no app account and no telemetry. This page explains what the isolation and encryption actually protect — and where the boundary is.
- Windows DPAPI at rest
- One partition per account
- No telemetry
Session isolation
An account cannot see another account's session.
Each account is rendered from a persistent Chromium partition named persist:<service>__<account>. Cookies (including HttpOnly), localStorage, IndexedDB and cache live in that partition and nowhere else.
Isolated rendering
Account pages run in WebContentsView instances with sandboxing, context isolation and deny-by-default permission handlers.
No page access to the app
Login capture and filling happen in an isolated-world preload. The page's own JavaScript is not given the app's APIs or saved credentials.
Popups stay in the account
OAuth and popup URLs open inside the same account's tab and partition, so an SSO hand-off does not silently switch identity.
Passwords & tokens
Encrypted at rest, bound to the right origin.
Saved logins and API tokens are encrypted with Electron's safeStorage, which uses Windows DPAPI. They are decrypted only in the main process; the UI receives summaries and booleans, not the secrets.
- Account-bound: a login belongs to the account that typed it, so two accounts on one service never share a password.
- Origin-bound: capture and fill verify the service's own domains. A password typed on an OAuth hop or a look-alike page is not captured as that account's login, and a saved login is not filled outside those domains.
- Validated before storage: API tokens are checked against the service's read-only endpoint before being saved.
- Revocable: tokens can be removed in one click. Deleting an account also removes its saved logins.
- Passwords never reach the chrome UI process. The manager shows which logins exist, not their contents.
Storage locations
Registry, sessions, settings
%APPDATA%\multi-acc-managerEncrypted tokens
tokens.jsonEncrypted saved logins
credentials.jsonBrowser session data
persist:* partitionsNo plaintext password file is written. Partition cookie databases are encrypted at rest with an AES-GCM key wrapped by DPAPI.
Threat model
What this protects against — and what it cannot.
| Scenario | Protected? | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Another Windows user on the same PC opens your data folder | Yes | DPAPI ties the encryption key to your Windows account. |
| A stolen disk or a copied data folder | Yes | Saved secrets and partition data are encrypted at rest. |
| One account's page reads another account's session | No path | Separate persistent Chromium partitions; no shared cookie jar. |
| A look-alike page tries to capture a saved password | Blocked | Capture and fill are limited to the service's own origins. |
| Malware running as your Windows user | No | It can act as you and reach the same DPAPI-protected data. No desktop app can prevent this. |
| A compromised provider dashboard | No | The app shows the service's real page; it cannot secure the service itself. |
| An unsigned installer is swapped for another executable | Limited | The CLI verifies the download is a Windows executable, but the installer is not code-signed yet. |
Privacy
Nothing syncs anywhere.
Accounts, open tabs, settings, plugins, saved logins and tokens stay in %APPDATA%\multi-acc-manager on the Windows machine where you signed in.
No telemetry
The app does not send usage analytics, crash telemetry or an installation identifier to a server. Update checks go to the public GitHub release feed.
No app account
There is nothing to register for. The app does not create an identity of its own; it only hosts the identities you sign into.
No sync
There is no multi-device sync and no cloud backup. Copying the data folder to another machine does not carry usable DPAPI secrets.
No scraping
The app is not a scraper and does not automate account creation. Provider status is read only when you add a token, and only through read-only API endpoints.
Limits, stated plainly
Things the product does not claim to solve.
| Windows only | Windows 10 and 11, 64-bit. macOS and Linux are not supported yet. |
| Unsigned installer | SmartScreen warns on first run. Choose More info → Run anyway. Code signing is planned. |
| No Chrome Web Store extensions | Electron cannot run them. Ad-blocking and Dark Reader's dark-mode engine are built in instead. |
| Google's third-party sign-in rule | “Continue with Google” is blocked by Google inside embedded browsers. Google's own sign-in works; the Browser button handles stubborn third-party flows. |
| Some dashboards may refuse to load | Google Cloud Console is a known case. Use the Browser button to finish that flow in your system browser. |
| Provider terms still apply | Multiple accounts are technically possible, not necessarily permitted. GitHub and Railway are one-account-per-person; use organisations and workspaces. |
Know the boundary
Use it for what it is good at.
Isolated identities, local storage and no server. Not a defence against malware on your own account.